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INVESTOR REACTIONS TO INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: 
CAN PROVIDING PUBLIC INFORMATION ABOUT FIRMS’ POLLUTION IMPROVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE? 
Abstract 
 
Information disclosure has been touted as a powerful tool to effect change in 
environmental quality. Nascent efforts to augment federal information disclosure have begun in 
Georgia. We conduct the first empirical analysis of investor reactions to a Pollutant Release and 
Transfer Register (PRTR) outside of the United States.  In contrast to the U.S. studies, we find no 
evidence of negative investor reactions to firms listed on Japan’s PRTR.  We identify several 
institutional reasons for these contradictory results.  Our results suggest that PRTRs may not 
have the same effect in all locations and thus further empirical studies of the burgeoning number 
of PRTRs being implemented globally are warranted. 
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INVESTOR REACTIONS TO INFORMATION DISCLOSURE: 
CAN PROVIDING PUBLIC INFORMATION ABOUT FIRMS’ POLLUTION IMPROVE 
ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE? 
1. Introduction 
In 2001, Georgia’s Department of Natural Resources (DNR) Board debated and then passed a 
resolution to require public labeling of surface water point sources of pollution (amendments to 
Rules for Water Quality Control, Chapter 391-3-6, "Labeling of NPDES Outfalls”; DNR 2001a, 
2001b).  The labeling consists of signs two feet by two feet with the following information: (1) 
type of discharge (treated industrial water, treated municipal water, cooling water);, (2) facility 
name, (3) NPDES permit number and if there are multiple discharges from the facility, the outfall 
number, (4) the owner phone number, and (5) the Environmental Protection Division’s (EPD) 
emergency phone number.   
Alan Hallum, Chief of DNR’s Water Protection Branch, stated that the purpose of labeling 
was to “give an individual who is recreating on a river or stream information that there is a 
permitted treated wastewater facility in the area” (DNR 2001a).  However, many believed that 
the amendment would have more far-reaching effects than just transferring information. When 
asked his opinion at a sub-committee meeting of the DNR Board, the Director of the EPD at the 
time, Mr. Harold Reheis, stated that he believed that labeling outfalls would help improve water 
quality in the state (DNR 2001a).  A clue to how such improvements might take place can be 
found in comments on the amendment by Randy Quintrell, representing the Georgia Pulp and 
Paper Association and the Georgia Mining Association. Mr. Quintrell believed the “the effect [of 
the amendment] will be punitive” and “the public will have negative impression when they see 
signs that have not been there before.”  The public’s  potentially “negative impression” was one 
reason that an earlier proposal to include on the sign the specific chemicals being discharge 
(legally) was not included in the final amendment. 
Information disclosure strategies have been touted in many parts of the world as powerful 
and cost-effective tools to effect substantial change in environmental quality.  Such strategies 
involve private or public attempts to provide environmental information about firms to 
consumers, stakeholders, and the public at large (Tietenberg and Wheeler 2001).  Through their 
informed actions, these members of the public are assumed to pressure firms to improve their 
environmental performance. In a recent annual report, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
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(EPA 2001) wrote that “[e]nvironmental information is one of EPA’s most valuable tools for 
protecting human health and the environment.” 
One popular information disclosure strategy is the establishment of a Pollutant Release and 
Transfer Register (PRTR).  A PRTR is a system that collects data, creates a database, and 
discloses information about potentially harmful chemical substances released to the environment 
or transferred off-site for treatment and disposal.  The Toxics Release Inventory of the United 
States is the best known example of a PRTR, but many OECD nations, and an increasing number 
of developing nations, have also implemented PRTRs (OECD 2001; Tietenberg and Wheeler 
2001).  Georgia’s outfall labeling initiative is simply one mechanism for disseminating to the 
public centralized information about known sources of pollution. 
Governments establish PRTRs for a variety of reasons including communities’ right-to-know 
and to allow stakeholders to bring pressure on pollution sources to curb their pollution. Investors 
are one important group of stakeholders that can affect the behavior of private firms that pollute. 
Past studies have hypothesized that the release of PRTR data creates investor reactions that lead 
to reduced demand for the shares of firms listed in a PRTR, thereby creating pressures on firms 
to reduce subsequent emissions (Hamilton 1995; Konar and Cohen 1997; Khanna et al. 1998).  
These studies have found that firms included in the PRTR experienced significantly negative 
abnormal returns to their stocks following the release of the PRTR data.   
Despite the growing global popularity of PRTRs, however, previous studies on investor 
reactions have been limited to a single program: the Toxics Release Inventory (TRI) of the 
United States.  We conduct the first empirical analysis of investor reactions to a PRTR outside of 
the United States.  The next section presents the data.  Section 3 describes the empirical method.  
Section 4 presents the results.  Section 5 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Data 
Japan implemented its PRTR on a national-scale in fiscal year 2001 (April 2001 – March 2002).  
Facilities must report annually the amount of 354 chemicals released on-site to the air, water, and 
land, and the amount injected underground, discharged into the public sewage system or 
transferred off-site for treatment and disposal.  A facility must file a report if it (1) operates 
within any of the 23 listed industry sectors, (2) has 21 or more full-time employees, and (3) 
handles more than 5,000 kg of any listed chemical during the fiscal year.1  The 2001 reports were 
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due July 2002. The first public release of PRTR data was on 20 March 2003.   
The facility-level data were available to the public on a compact disc upon request (same 
day) from the Japanese Ministry of the Environment. Firm-level emissions data were constructed 
by manually matching, for each facility, the company name, the headquarters address, and the 
name of the company president. The data comprise 4,124 facilities owned by 1,072 publicly 
traded companies. These companies make up 31% of public companies in Japan, including 42% 
of the “First Section” of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (the vast majority of the volume traded on 
the Tokyo Stock Exchange is in the First Section). 
Stock price data come from the Kabuka Chart (Stock Price Chart) compiled by Toyo Keizai 
Inc. As an indicator of the return to the market portfolio, we use the TOPIX (Tokyo Stock Price 
Index), which is a value-weighted index of all companies listed in the First Section of the Tokyo 
Stock Exchange. After selecting those companies trading in the First and Second Sections for 
which complete stock price data existed for the estimation window (see next section) and for 
which there were no confounding events (e.g., stock split), we have a sample of 564 PRTR-listed 
firms. 
 
3. Model 
The three studies of investor reactions to the release of TRI data in the U.S. used the event 
study methodology (MacKinley 1997) to test whether firms reporting to the TRI incurred 
statistically significant abnormal returns following the release of the TRI data.  We use the same 
methodology.  The theoretical basis of the event study methodology is the efficient market 
hypothesis. The hypothesis predicts that in a well-functioning capital market, a firm’s stock price 
reflects all available information about the firm’s future profits.  Pollution data provided by a 
PRTR may change investors’ expectations of the firm’s future profitability and create abnormal 
returns. 
The event study starts with estimating the following linear relationship between the returns 
of each security and the market portfolio: 
itmtiiit RR εβα ++=  
(1) 
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where  is the individual firm return at time t and  is the market return at time t. Equation 
(1) is estimated using daily returns during the estimation window, which is defined as a 250-
trading day period beginning with 259 trading days and ending 10 trading days prior to the event 
day.  The event day is defined as the day the PRTR data were released: 20 March 2003. The 
government began accepting requests for facility-level data at 2 pm on March 20.  Investors may 
not have had time to analyze the data before the market closed at 3 pm, and thus we estimate 
abnormal returns on both the event day and the following trading day, March 24 (Friday the 21st 
was a national holiday). 
itR mtR
The abnormal return for firm i on day t is defined as the difference between the actual return 
and the predicted return: .  The test statistic for abnormal returns is the 
aggregated cumulative abnormal return during the 
mtiiiit RRAR βα ˆˆ −−=
event window.2 We test for significant 
abnormal returns in three event windows. The first window is the event day (denoted as window 
0) and the second window is the following trading day (window 1).  To examine if abnormal 
returns persisted, we use a 6-day window that includes the release day (denoted as window 0-5). 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Table I presents estimates of abnormal returns and their significance. The first column shows the 
aggregate abnormal returns of all firms included in the PRTR. We find evidence of significantly 
positive abnormal returns on the event day.  In fact, for 0-5 day window, we find large, 
significantly positive abnormal returns. 
The distribution of emissions across publicly-traded firms, however, is highly skewed, with 
few very large polluters. These large polluters may have been the only firms to experience 
significantly negative abnormal returns.  To test this hypothesis, we selected the top 50 firms in 
terms of total emissions (on-site emissions plus off-site transfers) and estimated their abnormal 
returns. We further hypothesized that investors might have found it cumbersome to calculate and 
compare total emissions across firms and thus may have compared the number of chemicals 
reported instead. We thus estimated the abnormal returns of the top 50 firms in terms of the 
number of chemicals reported.  These results are shown in the second and third columns of Table 
I.  In both cases, abnormal returns on the event day are neither negative nor statistically different 
from zero. The abnormal returns on the following day are negative as hypothesized, but these 
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returns are not statistically different from zero. Thus, we observe no evidence that investors 
reacted negatively to the PRTR data release.3
 
Table I.   Abnormal Returns for Firms Listed in the PRTR 
Window All firms 
Top 50 firms in total 
emissions 
Top 50 firms in number 
of chemicals 
0 
0.00215 
  (2.114)** 
0.00309 
(1.040) 
0.00246 
(0.926) 
1 
0.00179 
(1.767) 
-0.00330 
(-1.111) 
-0.00028 
(-0.106) 
0-5 
0.0239 
      (9.612)*** 
0.00115 
(0.158) 
0.0139 
    (2.136)** 
Number of observations 564 50 52 
Note:  Z statistics are shown in parentheses. 
 Because of ties, there are 52 observations in the top 50 firms in number of chemicals. 
 ** Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*** Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
 
To explain the difference between the results from past TRI studies, which found 
significantly negative reactions, and this study, which found either no reaction or a significantly 
positive one, we identify two important, and related, differences in the institutional environments 
of the two programs.  First, King and Lenox (2001) point out that investors may react to the 
negative media coverage rather than the release of PRTR data itself.  After the TRI data were 
first released, there was media coverage that focused attention on firms with large emissions of 
chemicals in TRI data (Hamilton 1995).  In contrast, there was no firm-level media coverage 
related to Japan’s PRTR in the week after the data were released.  In fact, in a search for PRTR-
related articles in the Nikkei Goo database4 between March 20, 2003 and January 31, 2004, only 
63 articles were found within which only two firms and their emissions were mentioned. The 
other articles simply mentioned aggregate PRTR emissions data or covered another topic not 
directly related to emissions. 
Second, national non-profit conservation organizations were an important force in the U.S. 
in publicizing TRI data to the larger population, thereby affecting investor behaviors directly 
through information interpretation and indirectly by affecting consumer behaviors. For example, 
on the day the TRI data were released, the Natural Resources Defense Council published a report 
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of the release of carcinogenic chemicals (a subset of the TRI chemicals), which spurred media 
coverage that reported on large emitters of TRI chemicals (Konar and Cohen 1997).  In contrast, 
such leadership was not observed in Japan when the PRTR data were released. In Japan, non-
profit groups are few in comparison to the U.S. and are typically operating at the level of the 
neighborhood or town (Pekkanen 2001).  Custom and regulations have lead to a situation in 
which there are few large professional non-profit organizations capable of affecting the 
behaviors of investors, journalists, and the general public.  
The absence of any evidence of negative investor reactions is also consistent with a recent 
study of the factors that affect the development of Environmental Management Systems (EMSs) 
among Japanese firms (Uchida and Ferraro 2003).  Although consumer and regulatory pressures 
were found to significantly affect the development of firms’ EMSs, investor pressures had no 
discernable effect. Thus investors in the Japanese stock market may care less about 
environmental performance than do investors on the U.S. stock market.  
One may wonder, however, why this study detected positive investor reactions in the full 
sample. When we examined the abnormal returns to PRTR firms in the days leading up to the 
event date, we detected significantly negative abnormal returns.5 We hypothesize that, based on 
analyses of investor reactions in the United States after the release of TRI data, investors in Japan 
anticipated negative abnormal returns from the release of PRTR data and acted before the release 
day. However, the release provided no new relevant information and thus those who had exited 
the market before the event date re-entered and bid prices back up. 
 
5. Conclusion 
In their review of information disclosure strategies for environmental protection, Tietenberg and 
Wheeler (2001) write that, “[p]ublic announcements do seem to affect stock market valuations of 
firms” (p. 112). We tested whether firms listed in Japan’s PRTR incurred significantly negative 
abnormal returns to their stocks following the release of the PRTR data.  We find no compelling 
evidence of such negative investor reactions. 
Our results stand in stark contrast to results from analyses of the United States Toxics 
Release Inventory (TRI), the best known PRTR in the world.  We attribute these differences to 
(1) the absence of firm-level media coverage after the release of Japan’s PRTR data, and (2) 
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weaker social pressures from non-profit conservation organizations. Related work on the 
environmental managements systems of Japanese firms also suggests that investors in the 
Japanese stock market may care less about environmental performance than do investors in the 
U.S. stock market.  Future analyses of changes in firm emissions after subsequent releases of the 
PRTR data may help shed further light on the PRTR’s role in achieving environmental objectives 
in Japan. 
As noted in the Introduction, governments may implement PRTRs for a variety of reasons, 
including the rights of communities to know about what chemicals are emitted in their 
environments.  Thus the absence of evidence of negative investor reactions to the release of 
PRTR data does not imply that the PRTR in Japan is a failure (nor does it imply that investor 
reactions will not be observed in the future).  It does, however, suggest that the U.S. TRI 
experience may not be replicated in every detail in other nations or even within states in the U.S.  
Institutions and cultural norms and preferences matter for most economic outcomes, and thus one 
should not be surprised that they may also matter in environmental policy.  Empirical analyses of 
information disclosure efforts in other nations and across states within the U.S. are thus clearly 
warranted. 
 
Notes 
1. There are other minor conditions. For details, English translation of the PRTR Law can be accessed at 
http://www.env.go.jp/chemi/prtr/e-low.html and http://www.env.go.jp/chemi/prtr/e-co.html. 
2. See MacKinley (1997) for more details on the test statistic. We also tested the significance using a 
method suggested by Dodd and Warner (1983), but our conclusions were unchanged. We replicated 
Hamilton’s (1995) results to confirm that our methodology is correct.  We thank Professor Hamilton for 
sharing his data with us. 
3. Further breakdowns of the sample (e.g., by industry, removing the top polluters, etc.) also failed to 
generate any evidence of negative investor reactions. 
4. The Nikkei Goo is a database administered by the Nikkei Newspaper, which is Japan’s equivalent of the 
Wall Street Journal.  The database covers major magazines and daily newspapers in Japan. 
5. For example, on the day prior to the event day, abnormal returns = -0.00761 (z = -7.495).  For the 
window of 1 to 3 trading days prior to the event day, abnormal returns = -0.00907 (z = -5.156). 
 
 7
 
References 
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), 2001a. Minutes of the Environmental Protection 
Committee.  August 21, 2001.   Available at 
http://www.state.ga.us/dnr/board/minutes/epd082101.html
Department of Natural Resources (DNR), 2001b. Minutes of the DNR Board.  October 24, 2001.   
Available at 
http://www.gadnr.org/minutes/board102401.html
Dodd, P. and J.B. Warner (1983), ‘On Corporate Governance: A Study of Proxy Contests’, 
Journal of Financial Economics 11, 401-38. 
Environmental Protection Agency (2001), Annual Report, Fiscal Year 2001. Washington, D.C.: 
EPA. 
Hamilton, J. (1995), ‘Pollution as News: Media and Stock Market Reactions to the Toxics 
Release Inventory Data’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 28(1), 98-
113. 
Khanna, M., W.R. Quimio and D. Bojilova (1998), ‘Toxics Release Information: A Policy Tool 
for Environmental Protection’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management 
36(3), 243-66. 
King, A. and M.J. Lenox (2001), ‘Does It Really Pay to Be Green? An Empirical Study of Firm 
Environmental and Financial Performance’, Journal of Industrial Ecology 5(1), 105-116. 
Konar, S. and M.A. Cohen (1997), ‘Information as Regulation: The Effect of Community Right 
to Know Laws on Toxic Emissions’, Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management 32(1), 109-124. 
MacKinley, A.C. (1997), ‘Event Studies in Economics and Finance’, Journal of Economic 
Literature 35(1), 13-39. 
OECD (2001), Why Pollutant Release and Transfer Registers (PRTRs) Differ: A Review of 
National Programmes. Paris: OECD. 
Pekkanen, R. (2001), ‘An Analytical Framework for the Development of the Nonprofit Sector 
and Civil Society in Japan’, Nonprofit Sector Research Fund Working Paper Series. 
Washington, D.C.: The Aspen Institute. 
Tietenberg, T. and D. Wheeler (2001), ‘Empowering the Community: Information Strategies for 
Pollution Control’, in H. Folmer, H.L. Gabel, S. Gerking and A. Rose eds., Frontiers of 
Environmental Economics. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. 
Uchida, T. and P. Ferraro (2003), ‘The Adoption of Environmental Management Systems and 
their Effect on the Environment: Evidence from Japanese Manufacturers’, Georgia State 
University Environmental Policy Program Working Paper Series #2003-004. 
 8
 
